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Arguing a fortiori 
 
Luís Duarte d’Almeida* 
 
Final version published in The Modern Law Review 80:2 (2017) 202-237 
 
Abstract: Courts and lawyers often argue a fortiori. Sometimes they actually use the Latin phrase to indicate 
that their conclusions do not just follow, but “follow a fortiori” from certain premises. These are taken to be 
inferences of a distinct and important kind. But how exactly are they distinct, and why are they important? 
Despite their popularity, a fortiori arguments are not well understood and have not drawn much attention from 
legal theorists. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to bring out the form of a fortiori arguments, 
articulating those assumptions that, though typically left unstated, are necessary elements of arguments of this 
kind. The second goal is to say something about the point of such arguments, and to characterise the sort of 
context in which an arguer will have reason to deploy an a fortiori rather than an inference of a different type. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Courts and lawyers often argue a fortiori. Sometimes they actually use the Latin phrase to 
indicate that their conclusions do not just follow, but “follow a fortiori” from certain 
premises. These are taken to be inferences of a distinct and important kind. But how exactly 
are they distinct, and why are they important? That is less clear. Despite their popularity, a 
fortiori arguments are not well understood and have not drawn much attention from legal 
theorists. 
I try in this paper to make some progress on the topic. I will be pursuing two goals. The 
first is to bring out the form of a fortiori arguments, articulating those assumptions that, 
though typically left unstated, are necessary elements of arguments of this kind. That will be 
the object of the first four sections. The second goal is to say something about the point of 
such arguments, and to characterise the sort of context in which an arguer will have reason to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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deploy an a fortiori rather than an inference of a different type. That will be my task in the 
fifth and last section. 
The first three sections are dedicated to identifying several features that lawyers will, I 
think, recognise upon reflection as the key components of the a fortiori. I will therefore be 
relying on my readers’ pre-theoretical familiarity with such arguments: that is precisely what 
will enable them to evaluate the soundness of my proposed account. I will also rely on 
readers’ ability to know an a fortiori argument when they see it. For courts do occasionally 
misuse the “a fortiori” label in connection with arguments of other kinds; and genuine 
instances of the argument do not need, of course, to come explicitly marked or classified in 
any way. 
So, for example, I take it that you will agree that Lord Kerr in Moohan and another v 
The Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67 was offering an a fortiori argument (among other 
considerations) in support of his view that Article 3P1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights was applicable to the Scottish independence referendum. This Article imposes 
an obligation on states to hold elections “under conditions which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.” Lord Kerr writes: 
 
This phrasing [of Article 3P1] may, on one view, point to a focus on legislative elections, but it by no 
means justifies an exclusion of other votes. Why should it? If voting for a representative in a legislature is 
deemed sufficiently important that it should be guaranteed to all, why would voting for the form of 
government be deemed less important? 
 
This is a good example of an a fortiori argument, and I will say more about it in the fourth 
section of this paper. By contrast, the following passage, from Yearworth and others v North 
Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, is not—the Court of Appeal’s own claim 
notwithstanding—an instance of an a fortiori argument: 
 
Had we reached the conclusion that the law in respect of parts or products of a living human body 
precluded our holding that the men had ownership of sperm for the purposes of their claims in the tort of 
negligence, it would clearly have been important for us to proceed to inquire whether nevertheless they had 
such lesser rights in relation to it as would render them capable of having been bailors of it. Our conclusion 
that the men had ownership of it for the purposes of their claims in tort obviates the need for that particular 
inquiry: for from that conclusion it follows a fortiori that the men had sufficient rights in relation to it as to 
render them capable of having been bailors of it. 
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If someone has ownership of a thing, then he does have sufficient rights as to render him 
capable of having been bailor of it. So the court’s conclusion follows—just not a fortiori. It is 
simply that ownership is a bundle of normative positions that contains those latter rights as a 
sub-class. 
Scholars too sometimes give confused examples. David Daube points out that certain 
kinds of argument that courts typically use—including arguments a fortiori—are not the 
exclusive province of lawyers; they are also used in everyday argumentation: 
 
[T]ake as illustration the inference a fortiori—to be sure, any layman might reason thus: “Here is a 
teetotaller who does not touch cider; he will certainly refuse whisky.”1 
 
But this is not a good illustration. The putative a fortiori inference would rely on the fact that 
the teetotaller does not touch cider, to infer that he will refuse whisky. Yet if we know that he 
is a teetotaller, then the fact that he does not touch cider plays no role in the argument: if he is 
a teetotaller, then it already follows that he will certainly refuse whisky. A better illustration 
would be simply this: 
 
“He does not touch cider; he will certainly refuse whisky.” 
 
Daube is right, though, that a fortiori arguments are just as usual and natural outside the law 
as they are among lawyers. There is nothing specifically legal about this type of inference, 
regardless of what some authors suggest.2 And perhaps it will be helpful to adopt Daube’s 
(revised) illustration as a working example as we begin to make progress in understanding 
how these inferences actually work. We will come back, of course, to real instances of the 
legal a fortiori—in the third and especially in the fourth section, when the preceding 
conclusions will be tested against several examples from judicial decisions. But the cider-
and-whisky argument—stripped of any reference, explicit or implicit, to teetotallers—is a 
good specimen to tackle at first precisely because it is an everyday example. It is easy to 
grasp, and free of legal jargon and distracting technicalities. So let us start by trying to 
identify its elements and structure. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 David Daube, “Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric” (1949) 22 Hebrew Union 
College Annual 239-264 at 254. 
2 Klug classifies the a fortiori as one of the “special arguments of legal logic” (“spezielle Argumente der 
juristischen Logik”). See Ulrich Klug, Juristische Logik (4th ed., Berlin: Springer 1982) 109. 
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THE ELEMENTS OF THE A FORTIORI 
 
The first thing to note is that in arguing “He does not touch cider; he will certainly refuse 
whisky” we will be comparing two things—cider and whisky—and inferring, on the basis 
that he (our friend, say) will (or would) not drink the former, that he will also not drink the 
latter. Why exactly not? The argument as expressed is silent about that. But we will only 
understand the inference if we grasp the point of the comparison. Suppose, then, that the 
context in which the argument is being put forward makes clear that the comparison concerns 
the alcohol content of the two kinds of beverage, and more specifically the fact that cider is 
lower in alcohol content than whisky. And the thought behind the argument as expressed 
would seem to be this: if cider, lower in alcohol content as it is, is nevertheless already so 
high in alcohol content that our friend would refuse it—if it is already too high in alcohol 
content for our friend to accept it—then surely whisky, too, is high enough in alcohol content 
that our friend would refuse it. 
In order to begin to make sense of the argument, then, we have to track and bring out an 
assumption which we take the arguer to be relying upon regarding the reason why our friend 
will—or so the arguer claims—refuse whisky. The assumption is that the friend’s refusal is 
due to the beverage’s alcohol content. It is only in view of some such property that cider and 
whisky can be meaningfully contrasted for the purposes of the argument. If our friend’s 
objection to cider was based instead, say, on the fact that cider is made from fruit, or that it is 
a fermented beverage, then we would not be able to infer from that that he would also object 
to whisky. After all, refusing cider and accepting whisky are perfectly compatible actions; 
taken by itself, the claim that our friend would refuse cider is logically consistent with the 
claim that he would accept whisky. 
Now in identifying this assumption—that the reason our friend rejects cider is that its 
alcohol content is too high—we have singled out what I will call a “scalar” property: a 
property—alcohol content—that something can have either more or less of. And we have 
also made clear that there is a relevant threshold in the scale, a point or degree T of alcohol 
content, such that if the alcohol content of a certain beverage meets the threshold—if it is 
equal to or higher than T—then our friend will, the arguer claims, refuse it. That seems to be 
an implicit premise in the argument; we can perhaps spell it out as follows: 
 
(P) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
!
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What seems to be going on in the argument, then, is that on the basis of the information that 
cider meets the relevant threshold (whatever that threshold is), we can validly infer that 
whisky meets it, too, given that whisky ranks even higher on the scale of alcohol content. If 
cider meets the threshold, then so does whisky. 
Here is a first attempt at reconstructing the full cider-and-whisky argument, bringing out 
all of its premises—that is, all the premises (whether or not they have been explicitly stated) 
on which we take the arguer to be relying: 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
(2) Cider meets T. 
(3) Whisky ranks higher than cider on the scale of alcohol content. 
Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) Whisky meets T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)), 
(5) Our friend will refuse whisky. 
 
This will need to be refined, but it puts us on the right path. And there are two important 
aspects of this argument that we can highlight straight away. First, it is deductively valid; it 
is, more precisely, a chain of deductively valid arguments. (We could have reconstructed the 
inference as a single deductive step from the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3), to the 
conclusion in (5), omitting the first inference—from (2) and (3) to (4)—altogether; but we 
make things much clearer by differentiating the two steps.) If all the premises are true, then 
the conclusion too will be true.  
 Second, there is one further intermediate conclusion—call it “(2a)”—which follows 
deductively from (1) and (2), and which we could also have brought out: 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
(2) Cider meets T. 
 Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (2a) Our friend will refuse cider. 
(3) Whisky ranks higher than cider on the scale of alcohol content. 
!
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Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) Whisky meets T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)),  
(5) Our friend will refuse whisky. 
 
Note that, interestingly, the claim in (2a) was the single one that the arguer had actually made 
explicit: the argument as expressed, remember, ran simply as “He does not touch cider; he 
will certainly refuse whisky.” On the face of it, then, the arguer gives us a single premise—
the claim that our friend will refuse cider—in support of the conclusion that our friend will 
refuse whisky. That single claim, together with information discerned from the context in 
which the argument is being made, provided the basis for our interpretative reconstruction of 
the further premises we take the arguer to be implicitly relying on, and of how those premises 
connect with the conclusion of the argument; but once we have unpacked these premises into 
the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3), the claim in (2a) no longer needs to be spelled out as a 
part of the argument in order for the inference to run. In a sense, then, the argument as 
originally stated included none of its crucial premises; and that, as we will see, is one of the 
noteworthy features of a fortiori arguments.3 
I said that our reconstructive work is not yet finished—there may be more to the cider-
and-whisky argument than we have uncovered so far. But before we proceed with that task 
we can try to begin to isolate the form of this argument: the common form, that is, of 
arguments like this. What should we say? Here is a first, half-way attempt: 
 
(i) There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x meets T, then our 
friend will refuse x. 
(ii) a meets T. 
(iii) b ranks higher than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii) and (iii)), 
(iv) b meets T.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Let me also reiterate—even though the point is obvious—that (2a) does not entail (5). That is why I said 
in the Introduction that the court’s argument in the Yearworth case, or Daube’s original version of the cider-and-
whisky inference, are not instances of a fortiori arguments. If your “target” claim just follows from your 
“source” claim, you are not arguing a fortiori. 
4 This intermediate inference—the inference from (ii) and (iii) to (iv)—bears some structural similarity to 
what Sion isolates as one (complete) valid pattern of a fortiori argument: he calls it the “positive subjectal 
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Therefore (from (i) and (iv)), 
(v) Our friend will refuse b. 
 
Any instance of this pattern will be a deductively valid argument. But the formulation in (i) 
does not give us an adequate formalisation of the relevant premise. The problem does not lie 
with its first part—the part before the consequent of the conditional. The cider-and-whisky 
example is about beverages, but that is not a distinctive formal feature of the argument: what 
matters formally is not (of course) that our arguer is concerned with the consequences of the 
fact that a certain beverage meets a certain threshold of alcohol content. (It is obviously not a 
characteristic of a fortiori arguments that they are about alcoholic drinks.) What matters, 
rather, is that the arguer is concerned with the consequences of the fact that some item or 
object—it could be anything—meets a certain threshold of some scalar property—it could be 
any property. So it does seem appropriate to formalise the first part of premise (1) by writing, 
as I have above, that 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
mood” of the “copulative” a fortiori argument—he also calls it the “paradigm of a fortiori argument”—and 
renders it as “P is more R than (or as much R as) Q (is R); and Q is R enough to be S; therefore, all the more (or 
equally), P is R enough to be S.” See Avi Sion, A Fortiori Logic: Innovations, History and Assessments 
(Geneva: 2013) 10-11, 117. In this striking (and self-published) book, which includes, among other things, a 
minute study of the topic, Sion distinguishes between “copulative” and “implicational” a fortiori arguments, 
each of which comes in four moods, in a total of eight different valid patterns. All eight patterns are patterns of 
two-premise arguments combining four terms (or theses, as the case may be) P, Q, R, S, and all have 
conclusions of the form “. . . is (is not/implies/does not imply) . . . enough to be (to imply) . . .” But Sion’s 
formalisations are, I think, too crude to do justice to his insights. They are also potentially confusing. In his 
explanations he sometimes uses a scheme like “Rx” to represent the point on a given continuum R at which a 
certain item x stands—which suggests that “x” is to be taken to be an individual constant—but sometimes he 
also uses it to represent a relevant threshold on a continuum (for example, a point that any item x needs to meet 
in order to have a certain property)—which would make “x” a variable instead; and as a result he is led to say 
that an a fortiori argument orders three items (P, Q, and S), rather than just two, “according to their position in a 
common continuum” (21). Sion’s formalisations also fail to reflect the fact that a fortiori arguments are not—
certainly not necessarily—arguments for conclusions of the form “. . . is (is not/implies/does not imply) . . . 
enough to be (to imply) . . .” The cider-and-whisky argument is not an a fortiori inference for the conclusion 
that whisky is high-in-alcohol-content enough to be the sort of beverage that our friend would refuse (or 
something along those lines); it is an a fortiori inference for the conclusion that our friend will refuse it. 
Furthermore, the semantics of “. . . is . . . enough (or not enough) to be x” does not always licence inferences to 
“. . . is x”; I may be tall enough to be a basketball player, and yet not be one. 
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(i) There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x meets T, then . . . 
 
But what about the consequent of this conditional? How should we fill the ellipsis? In the 
formulation I gave above—formulation (i)—the consequent read: 
 
“. . . our friend will refuse x.” 
 
But this is unsatisfactory; a fortiori arguments are no more about friends and what they will 
refuse than they are about beverages and their alcohol content. That is why I said that the 
scheme above gives just a half-way formalisation of the argument. So we need to revise 
formulation (i), as well as formulation (v). What should we write? 
There is no principled limit to the range of kinds of consequences that could be attached 
to the fact that a certain object meets a certain threshold of some scalar property. In our cider-
and-whisky example we have a descriptive consequent with a particular form: we have a 
claim about what someone will do—refuse it—with regard to the alcoholic beverage in 
question. But we can easily imagine similar arguments with either differently shaped 
descriptive consequents (“. . . it will not freeze in a regular home freezer”) or with normative 
consequents (“. . . we should not overuse it in our sauce”). All that matters is that the 
consequent of the conditional somehow involve the threshold-meeting object; that, indeed, is 
what lends relevance to the fact that the object does meet the threshold. 
There is therefore, it seems, no single formalisation that would equally fit the wide range 
of consequences that are eligible to feature in an a fortiori argument. With this proviso in 
place, however, we can adopt the following simplified formulation as a way of highlighting 
the fact that the consequent of the conditional in the first premise of our argument—and so 
too the conclusion of the argument—is any claim, descriptive or normative, involving the 
threshold-meeting item: 
 
“. . . then x is Q.” 
 
To be clear, the point of my proviso is not merely that the consequent can be either a 
descriptive or a normative claim. The point, more generally, is that there is no reason to think 
that the consequent must be a claim in which something is predicated of the threshold-
meeting item. All that is necessary is that the consequent involve the threshold-meeting item 
in some way. By the same token, there is also no requirement that we have in the consequent 
!
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a variable specifically standing for the threshold-meeting items themselves: we could have 
variables standing for more complexly described items that involve but are not reducible to 
the threshold meeting items. (We can also have more complex premises involving further 
variables performing other roles.) We will see some examples of this further ahead, when we 
look at some real instances of the a fortiori in legal argument. 
If we rewrite (i) accordingly, then, this is what we get as the form of our cider-and-
whisky inference: 
 
(i') There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x meets T, then x is Q. 
(ii) a meets T. 
(iii) b ranks higher than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii) and (iii)), 
(iv) b meets T. 
Therefore (from (i) and (iv)), 
(v) b is Q. 
 
But as I said, we have more to uncover. 
 
 
THE TWO FORMS OF THE A FORTIORI 
 
Our discussion so far has revealed three simple but important features of the a fortiori. First, 
an a fortiori is an argument for a conclusion about a certain item or object. (The cider-and-
whisky argument, for example, is an argument for a conclusion about whisky.) We can call 
such an item the “target” of the argument.5 That is what the individual constant “b” stands for 
in the scheme above. Second, an a fortiori argument appeals to some scalar property P and to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This terminology is imported from the literature on analogy. I discuss analogical arguments at length in 
Luís Duarte d’Almeida and Cláudio Michelon, “The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law” 
(forthcoming). We can, of course, also have a fortiori arguments that target, not individual items, but any item 
satisfying a given description D. In that case, the relevant premises and conclusions would have correspondingly 
more complex forms (e.g. “For every x, if x is a D1, then x meets T”; “For every x and every y, if x is a D1, and y 
is a D2, then y ranks higher than x on the scale of P”; and so on). To keep things manageable and readable, 
however, I gloss over these complications: they are but variations on the schemes discussed in the text, and have 
no bearing on our understanding of how an a fortiori runs. 
!
10 
a certain threshold T on the scale of P, such that the position of the target with regard to the 
threshold is relevant for the conclusion of the argument. And third, the argument relies for its 
conclusion on information about both (a) whether some other item (which we can call the 
“source” item, symbolised as “a” in the scheme above) meets T, and (b) the relative positions 
of a and b on the scale of P. 
 But there are two ways in which the position of an item with regard to a certain threshold 
can be relevant to the conclusion of an argument. In our cider-and-whisky example, what 
matters is that a beverage does meet a certain threshold. But we can think of contexts in 
which what matters is instead that a certain threshold is not met by a certain target item; and 
such contexts offer the same opportunities for deploying a fortiori inferences. 
 To see this more clearly, consider once again the first intermediate inference in our 
scheme—the inference that takes us from (ii) and (iii) to (iv): 
 
(ii) a meets T. 
(iii) b ranks higher than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii) and (iii)), 
 (iv) b meets T. 
 
Any instance of this valid inference form will combine, as I just noted, information on two 
issues. One issue is whether a meets T. The other issue is the relative position of a and b on 
the scale of P. But of course not every possible combination of information on these two 
issues would allow us to construct a valid inference. Suppose that our information about the 
relative position of a and b on the scale of P was instead a claim of the following form: 
 
(iii*) b ranks lower than a on the scale of P. 
 
In that case we would not be able to conclude anything about whether b ranks high enough on 
the scale of P to meet T. Instances of the following scheme, in other words, would not be 
formally valid arguments: 
 
(ii) a meets T. 
(iii*) b ranks lower than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii) and (iii*)), 
(iv) b meets T. 
!
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The conclusion might still be true, of course. It might be true that b does meet the relevant 
threshold. But the point is that this is something that cannot be established on the basis of (ii) 
and (iii*): even if these premises are both true, the conclusion could still be false. 
Likewise, if, instead of (ii), what we knew about the place of a on the scale was that 
 
(ii*) a does not meet T, 
 
we would not be able to derive, from the conjunction of (ii*) and (iii), any conclusion about 
whether b meets T. In other words, the joint truth of 
 
(ii*) a does not meet T; and  
(iii) b ranks higher than a on the scale of P 
 
is consistent with b either meeting or not meeting the relevant threshold. 
Instances of the following scheme, on the other hand, would be formally valid 
inferences: 
 
(ii*) a does not meet T. 
(iii*) b ranks lower than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii*) and (iii*)), 
(iv*) b does not meet T. 
 
There are two ways, then, in which we can rely on combined information about (a) whether 
an item a meets a given threshold T on the scale of P, and (b) what the relative position of 
items a and b is on that scale, in order to validly derive a conclusion about (c) whether item b 
meets T. 
Now an inference of this second type—the valid inference from (ii*) and (iii*) to (iv*)—
would not be of much use in conjunction with an instance of premise (i') above. We would 
not be able to derive any conclusion from the conjunction of (i') and (iv*): 
 
(i') There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x meets T, then x is Q. 
(iv*) b does not meet T. 
 
!
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It would be fallacious to conclude from (i') and (iv*) that b is not Q. For a premise like (i') 
establishes that x’s meeting the threshold is a sufficient condition of x being Q, not a 
necessary one. So it could still be the case that b is Q even if b does not meet the threshold. 
But if on the other hand we couple (iv*) with a premise attaching relevance to the fact 
that the threshold is not met, a premise of the form 
 
(i*) There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x does not meet T, then 
x is Q, 
 
we will then be able to run a valid inference, and to put together an argument instantiating the 
following valid (complex) pattern: 
 
(i*) There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x does not meet T, then 
x is Q. 
(ii*) a does not meet T. 
(iii*) b ranks lower than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii*) and (iii*)), 
(iv*) b does not meet T. 
Therefore (from (i*) and (iv*)), 
(v*) b is Q.6 
 
There are therefore two forms of the a fortiori. Both proceed from source to target: both rely 
on a specific kind of information about the source item to establish a conclusion about the 
target item. The difference is that in one case—exemplified by our cider-and-whisky 
example—the source ranks lower than the target on the scale of the relevant property, while 
in the other case the source ranks higher than the target. 
That there are two forms of a fortiori arguments in law is not exactly a new point. In 
Continental jurisprudence lawyers and scholars draw a distinction between arguments a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 It makes no difference that the consequent of the conditional in (i*), and therefore also the conclusion in 
(v*), is the claim that b is Q. We would have an inference of the exact same kind if the consequent of the 
conditional in the first premise was instead the claim that b is not Q. What matters is that the antecedent of the 
conditional in (i*) is the claim that x does not meet the threshold, rather than (as in (i')) the claim that x does 
meet it. 
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maiore ad minus (literally, “from the greater to the lesser”) and arguments a minore ad maius 
(“from the lesser to the greater”), which they identify as two species of a fortiori arguments 
(even though “a fortiori” means, literally, “from the stronger”).7 What the actual difference 
between the two species is, though, is no better understood by Continental lawyers and 
theorists than it is by their common law counterparts; and although courts in common law 
jurisdictions today do not often use those two Latin phrases—the “a fortiori” label they do 
use frequently—they do, of course, offer arguments of both kinds. 
It will be helpful at this stage to start looking at some examples from actual judicial 
decisions—not just for illustration purposes, but also as a means of testing whether my 
proposed schemes do actually capture the arguments that courts are deploying. In this paper I 
look almost exclusively at examples from common law decisions. Here is one old but good 
example of an a fortiori of the second kind: an inference that proceeds from information 
about a higher-ranking source to a conclusion about a lower-ranking target. It is from Davies 
v. Jenkins [1900] 1 QB 133: 
 
In my opinion the county court judge’s decision in this case cannot be upheld. The schedule describing the 
“stock” as “2 horses, 4 cows” is not sufficiently specific to satisfy the statute [section 4 of the Bills of Sale 
Act, 1882]. In Carpenter v. Deen it was held that “21 milch cows” was an insufficient description. By that 
decision we are bound. Moreover, the cows here are not even described as milch cows. The description is 
therefore even less specific than in that case. As to the two horses, it follows a fortiori that their description 
is insufficient, for even Lopes LJ, the dissentient judge in Carpenter v. Deen, was of the opinion that, as it 
was usual to describe horses by their colour, a greater degree of particularity was required in the case of 
horses than in that of cows. The bill of sale was therefore bad as to the horses and cows. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Georges Kalinowski, “Interprétation juridique et logique des propositions normatives” (1959) 6-7 
Logique et Analyse 128-142 at 135-137; Jan Gregorowicz, “L’argument a maiore ad minus et le problème de la 
logique juridique” (1962) 17/18 Logique et Analyse 66-75; Eduardo García Maynez, “Die Argumente a simili 
ad simile, a maiore ad minus und a minore ad maius” (1965) 41 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie: 
Beiheft 115-135 at 123-133; Ilmar Tammelo, Outlines of Modern Legal Logic (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1969) 
127-128; Zygmunt Ziembiński, Practical Logic (Dordrecht: Springer 1976) 325-327; Giovanni Tarello, 
L’Interpretazione della Legge (Milano: Giuffrè 1980) 355-357. Klug remarks that the phrases are not always 
consistently used: see Juristische Logik (n. 2) 147. There is a review of literature up to 1990 in Thomas Kyrill 
Grabenhorst, Das argumentum a fortiori: Eine Pilot-Studie anhand der Praxis von Entscheidungsbegründungen 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang 1990) 9-62. And see also, outside the jurisprudential context, Sion’s discussion of the 
difference of orientation between what he identifies as the positive (from major to minor term or thesis) and the 
negative (from minor to major term or thesis) moods of a fortiori arguments, in A Fortiori Logic (n 4) 12-16. 
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There are two arguments here, and only the second is an a fortiori. The first is an argument 
for the conclusion that the description “4 cows” is insufficient; and this conclusion is based 
on the premise—backed by judicial authority—that a description specifying (a) that the cows 
are milch cows and (b) how many they are, is an “insufficient description.” It follows—
though this is not an a fortiori—that a description specifying only how many cows there are 
is also an “insufficient” description: if the conjunction of (a) and (b) is insufficient, then it 
follows logically that (b) alone is also insufficient. But then the court gives an a fortiori 
argument for the conclusion that “two horses” is also an insufficient description. Here is how 
this argument looks like when reconstructed as an instance of our second scheme: 
 
(1)! There is a point T on the scale of amount of information provided relative to the 
amount of information required such that, for any description x of livestock, if x 
does not meet T, then x fails to satisfy section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. 
(2) A description of cows specifying only their number does not meet T. 
(3) A description of horses specifying only their number ranks lower than a description 
of cows specifying only their number on the scale of amount of information 
provided relative to the amount of information required. 
Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) A description of horses specifying only their number does not meet T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)), 
(5) A description of horses specifying only their number fails to satisfy section 4 of the 
Bills of Sale Act, 1882.8 
 
What is the court comparing? Not cows and horses; what the court is comparing is the “4 
cows” and the “2 horses” descriptions—or rather, more generally, a description of cows that 
specifies only their number, and a description of horses that also specifies only their number. 
And the court’s point is that, since the amount of information required of a description of 
horses is higher than that required of a description of cows, the amount of information still 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 This is one example of an a fortiori argument whose target is actually any description of horses 
specifying only their number; the form of the conclusion would be “For any x, if x is a description of horses 
specifying only their number, then x fails to satisfy section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882”, and premises (2) 
and (3) have similarly complex forms: see n. 5 above. (The court could then go on to apply—by universal 
modus ponens—the general conclusion in (5) to the individual description contained in the schedule at issue in 
the particular the case at hand.) 
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missing from a description of horses that specifies only their number is greater than the 
amount of information missing from a description of cows that specifies only their number. 
There are a few things to note about this argument. One is that the threshold T mentioned 
in premise (1) is, of course, 100%. It is a tautology that a description of livestock needs to 
provide every single element that it needs to provide to satisfy the statutory provision. But 
that does not mean that premise (1) is itself a tautology. It isn’t. For the point, again, is that 
the precise catalogue of elements that a description of livestock needs to provide will vary 
depending on the type of livestock involved. What elements exactly does a description of 
cows need to meet? The court does not say. Nor does it have to take a view on that. For the 
court already knows that a description that specifies only the number of cows does not 
provide 100% of the elements it needs to provide to satisfy the statutory requirement. That is 
what premise (2) asserts. How can the court know this if it takes no view on exactly what 
elements are required? Because it can rely on the Carpenter v. Dean authority (combined 
with a simple logical inference) to establish that claim. Whatever the list of elements required 
for a sufficient description of cows is, one thing is clear: there is more to it than just 
specifying the number of cows and what they are kept for (e.g. their milk), and thus more to it 
than just specifying their number. And how many more (and exactly what) elements does a 
description of horses have to provide to meet the requirement? Again, the court does not 
say—or care. For, again, the court is able to justify on independent grounds the view, 
captured in premise (3), that, whatever the catalogue of required elements in descriptions of 
horses is, it is larger—more demanding—than the catalogue of required elements in 
descriptions of cows. 
The reason that I am drawing your attention to these features of the cows-and-horses 
argument is that they reflect what is, as I will suggest in the last section, the characteristic 
point of a fortiori arguments. But let us look at another example before we try to consolidate 
our thoughts. Consider the following argument, from Hallamshire Industrial Finance Trust 
Ltd v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1979] 2 All ER 433: 
 
Once the actual issues have become defined and the parties have had a full opportunity to argue all the 
points open to them on the notice of appeal, the commissioners give their decision on the issues actually 
raised. Having done so, in my opinion they have in any ordinary sense of the words “determined the 
appeal.” It is not open to a taxpayer to come back as of right and say: “There is another point which I have 
thought of on which there is an issue: please decide it.” Even less is it open to a taxpayer (such as the 
company in the present case) to come back and say: “There is another point as to which there is no issue 
between the parties which I require you to determine.” 
!
16 
 
This is an example of an a fortiori argument, although the court does not actually use the 
Latin expression; but the phrase “even less,” placed as it is just before the court’s conclusion, 
gives an indication (albeit a non-conclusive one) as to the nature of the intended inference. 
What then is the argument? I take the court’s point to be that there is more reason to allow a 
taxpayer to raise a new point on which there is an issue between the parties, than to allow a 
taxpayer to raise a new point on which there is no issue; but in the law’s view even that 
stronger reason is not strong or important or weighty enough to justify allowing a taxpayer to 
have a new decision made on the point. So here is one way of presenting the argument: 
 
(1) There is a point T on the scale of normative importance (or weight, or strength) 
such that, for every fact x, if x does not meet T, then x does not entitle a taxpayer to 
have a new decision made after the commissioners have determined all the issues 
that the parties had previously raised when given the opportunity to do so. 
(2) The fact that there is a previously unraised point on which there is (or may be) an 
issue between the parties does not meet T. 
(3) The fact that there is a previously unraised point on which there is no issue 
between the parties ranks lower than the fact that there is a previously unraised 
point on which there is (or may be) an issue between the parties on the scale of 
normative importance (or weight, or significance). 
Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) The fact that there is a previously unraised point on which there is no issue 
between the parties does not meet T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)), 
(5) The fact that there is a previously unraised point on which there is no issue 
between the parties does not entitle a taxpayer to have a new decision made after 
the commissioners have determined all the issues that the parties had previously 
raised when given the opportunity to do so. 
 
Note that here, again, there are some questions that the argument does not answer or need to 
answer. What exactly is the relevant threshold? How weighty, that is, would a new fact have 
to be to justify re-opening a decision process that we took to have been determined with 
finality? The court does not take a view on that; for it is in a position to assert—this is 
premise (2)—that, whatever that threshold exactly is, the mere fact that a new point would 
!
17 
have counted as a genuine issue between the parties is not important or weighty enough to 
meet it. And that, together with the further claim, in premise (3), about the relative position, 
on the scale, of the source and the target of the argument, is all it takes for the inference to 
run. 
But is there not, you may ask, one important aspect of this argument which the 
reconstruction above does not capture, and my proposed schemes do not include? I drew 
attention to the court’s use of the phrase “even less”: but is the thought expressed by this 
phrase reflected at all in my proposed reconstruction? The court’s claim, it seems, is not 
merely that a taxpayer is not entitled to a new decision on a point on which there is no issue 
between the parties (which is the claim that features as the conclusion of the reconstruction 
above). The court’s claim, rather, seems to be that such a taxpayer is even less entitled to a 
new decision than a taxpayer who might want to raise a point on which there is an issue 
between the parties.  
Now, taken literally, of course, this may sound nonsensical. How could something be 
less—or more—allowed than something else? Surely all we can say is that something either 
is or is not allowed; being allowed is not a matter of degree. And what could it mean to say 
that a conclusion, like the one in (5) above, is being put forth as being either more or less true 
than some other conclusion also put forth as true? 
But what this shows is not that the court is talking nonsense. What it shows is that the 
court’s use of the “even less” phrase is not to be taken literally. But perhaps it is to be taken 
seriously. Indeed, this and similar phrases—phrases like “all the more”, “even more so”, 
“even less so”, and so on—are phrases that arguers typically use when deploying a fortiori 
arguments. Sometimes, of course, these phrases will be used simply to emphasise the relative 
position of source and target: to mean that the target ranks even lower, or even higher, than 
the source on the relevant scale; and maybe that was all that the Hallamshire court meant. 
Sometimes, however, it seems that by those phrases arguers intend to point out a distinctive 
kind of relation between the premises and the conclusion—a distinctive kind of way in which 
the premises of an a fortiori argument support its conclusion. And scholars too seem to find it 
natural to use such phrases to refer to the conclusion of arguments of this sort. Here, for 
example, is how Arnold Kunst reports the fact that a fortiori arguments—in both the a maiori 
ad minus and the a minori ad maius varieties—were “favoured by the Talmud and the 
Scriptures as a significant means of expressing ritual commands and prohibitions”: 
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The inference de minore ad majus and vice versa . . . became an important instrument of legal disputations, 
and because of its convincing character was used as a means for the formulation of bye-laws. Unlike the 
Indians the Jews made no use of highly scientific and sometimes far-fetched formulations. They rather 
preferred, specially in their legal treatises, the method of common sense and the language of common 
parlance . . . The rites of religious festivals, the relative sanctity of which was settled with the utmost 
punctiliousness, were splendid objects for that kind of inference. What is prohibited at a minor festival, is 
so much the more illicit at a major one, and what is permitted at a greater festival, is so much the more licit 
(or less illicit) at an inferior one.9  
 
More illicit? Less illicit? But this is indeed “the language of common parlance.” Or take 
another legal example, from Glen Dowling v. The Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law 
Reform [2003] 2 IR 535: 
 
The termination of the applicant’s temporary release in this case occurred because it had come to the 
respondent’s attention that he was “the subject of a garda investigation into a serious claim,” as stated in 
the letter sent to him on behalf of the respondent on the 16th March, 2000. As this court made quite clear in 
The State (Murphy) v. Kielt [1984] IR 458, the mere fact that a prisoner has been charged with an offence 
is an insufficient reason for the revocation of his temporary release. In so holding in that case, Griffin J 
explained at p. 473 that:— 
 
“Charges are frequently dropped or not proceeded with and, if a temporary release can be revoked merely or solely 
because the person released has been charged with an offence, what of the apparent injustice done to such a person 
who, in the period intervening between the charge and the dropping of the charges, has lost the liberty to which he 
would otherwise had been entitled under the Act and Rules?” (emphasis added.) 
 
This reasoning must apply with even greater force in circumstances, such as this case, where a prisoner on 
temporary release was solely the subject of an investigation in relation to an alleged offence, arrested for 
that purpose, but never charged with any offence. 
 
Here again we can see the pattern that we have identified above. The court relies on a claim 
about a source item—the mere fact that a person has been charged with an offence is not 
sufficient to justify revoking their temporary license—to support a conclusion about a target 
item—the fact that a prisoner was solely the subject of an investigation in relation to an 
alleged offence, arrested but never charged, is also not sufficient to justify their temporary 
license. But we also find a claim about how the “reasoning”—the premises—supporting that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Arnold Kunst, “An Overlooked Type of Inference”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London 4 (1942) 976-991 at 984. 
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conclusion about the target item does not merely support the conclusion, but supports it “with 
even greater force.” But again: what does this mean? Does it mean that the first claim is not 
as solidly established as all that? That does not seem to be the point; the court looks certain 
that it really is the case that the mere fact that a prisoner was charged does not suffice as a 
reason to revoke his license. So what is this distinctive relation between premises and 
conclusions, this relation that arguers who give a fortiori arguments seem sometimes to 
assume when they use phrases like “with even greater strength,” “all the more,” “even less,” 
and so on? Whatever it is, it is true that it is not reflected in the schemes introduced so far. So 
let us see if there is a way of revising our schemes to accommodate this further aspect of the 
a fortiori. 
 
 
“ALL THE MORE,” “EVEN LESS,” AND SO ON 
 
One possibility that might come to mind as a way of explaining the import of these common 
phrases would be to suggest that the idea that the final conclusion of an a fortiori argument 
follows from its premises “even more strongly” or “with even greater strength” than the 
parallel conclusion regarding the source of the inference, means that that final conclusion 
really is stronger, in some sense, than the conclusion about the target.  
 The plaintiff in In re Besterman (deceased) [1983] 2 All ER 656 tried to press such a 
view of what “a fortiori reasoning” involves; here is how the Court of Appeal reported his 
argument: 
 
[B]earing in mind that the plaintiff is the only person to whom it could be said that the deceased owed any 
duty to make provision and that he left an estate of about £1½ m, [£259,000] is by no means a generous 
figure. It amounts to a little over one-sixth of the estate and so far as one can judge from those reported 
cases in the Family Division where very wealthy spouses have been involved it appears to bear very little 
relation to the provision which she would have been likely to have achieved if the marriage had ended in 
divorce. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that it is so plainly too low that this court ought to interfere . . . It 
would, he suggests, be a curious result that a party to a happy and contented marriage who has behaved 
impeccably should be thought to be entitled to a lesser provision from her husband than one who has, 
perhaps, behaved quite improperly and whose marriage has, in consequence, ended in divorce and 
dissension . . . Counsel for the plaintiff was contending that a figure of £350,000 would have been 
appropriate in the case of divorce and that by a fortiori reasoning £450,000 was appropriate in the case of 
death. 
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But this—this claim of the plaintiff’s about what follows a fortiori—won’t do. For one, we 
have already seen that the idea that the conclusion of an a fortiori inference follows “even 
more strongly” from the premises than does the conclusion about the source is an idea that 
holds even when the conclusions involved are all-or-nothing claims (like the claim that an 
action is forbidden), claims that cannot be “weakened” or “strengthened” in any meaningful 
sense. And what that seems strongly to suggest is that even when the claim that features as 
the final conclusion of an a fortiori argument is indeed a claim that could in some sense be 
either weakened or strengthened (like the claim that someone is entitled to a certain amount 
of money), the a fortiori argument itself is an argument that justifies applying the same 
conclusion to the target that applies to the source. Oliver LJ, who delivered the main 
judgment in Besterman, was right to write that 
 
I do not think that I can accept that because the marriage did not terminate by divorce in fact, therefore and 
a fortiori, she must be entitled to more; counsel for the plaintiff puts it (perhaps rather arbitrarily) at 
£100,000 more. 
 
This does not mean that the plaintiff did not have a good a fortiori argument. What it means 
is that the plaintiff did not have a good a fortiori argument for the conclusion that she was 
entitled to more than she would have been if her marriage had ended by divorce: that was just 
not the conclusion that the plaintiff’s a fortiori argument supported. But the plaintiff might 
have a valid a fortiori argument for the conclusion that she was entitled to the same as she 
would be entitled if the marriage had ended by divorce. And this does also not rule out, of 
course, the possibility that the plaintiff was indeed entitled to more than that, even to 
£100,000 more; it is simply that she would need a separate argument to establish that. 
If the final conclusion that is warranted by an a fortiori—the conclusion that concerns 
the target of the inference—is the same conclusion that is taken to apply to the source, should 
we then give up on trying to explain the idea that that final conclusion is “more strongly” 
supported by the premises than the conclusion about the source? Should we discount as a 
mere rhetorical flourish an arguer’s claim that the final conclusion follows “even more so” 
from the premises?  
Here is what we can say. The schemes introduced so far show, as I noted, that the 
conclusion that applies to the source of the argument is already deductively justified in the 
argument. In our cider-and-whisky argument, for example, (2a) follows deductively from (1) 
and (2): 
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(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
(2) Cider meets T. 
 Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (2a) Our friend will refuse cider. 
(3) Whisky ranks higher than cider on the scale of alcohol content. 
Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) Whisky meets T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)), 
(5) Our friend will refuse whisky. 
 
Now, if (2a), the conclusion about the source, is already deductively established in the 
argument—if the argument already puts it forth as being certainly true if premises (1) and (2) 
are true—then the final conclusion in the argument, (5), cannot be “more strongly” justified 
or supported on the basis of (1) and (4). For these are two deductive inferences with exactly 
the same form; and when it comes to the strength of an inference, the support afforded by 
deductive validity is as strong as it gets. But there is, I think, another sense in which it is 
perfectly meaningful to say that the claim in (5) may be more strongly supported than the 
claim in (2a). For it may be the case that our friend, despite his principled stance of refusing 
beverages that exceed a certain degree of alcohol content, might be willing, on some 
occasions, to make exceptions to the principle. He will have his reason or reasons for not 
drinking at least some alcoholic beverages: the reason is, suppose, that beverages with an 
alcohol content above a certain degree will give him a terrible headache. But he may find 
himself in a situation in which he will also have reasons for having a drink, and these reasons 
may outweigh his reasons for not doing it: imagine, for example, that our friend his presented 
with a newly produced wine by his son, a winemaker, who would really like to know his 
father’s opinion on how it tastes. Now suppose, additionally, that the higher the alcohol 
content of the beverage, the more intense our friend’s headache would be, ranging all the way 
up to almost paralyzing pain. In that case, it seems clear that the higher the degree of alcohol 
content of a certain beverage, the harder it will be for his reason against drinking it to be 
outweighed. In other words, the range of reasons that might outweigh his reason for not 
drinking whisky is narrower than the range of reasons that might outweigh his reason for not 
drinking cider. But what that means is that our friend has a stronger reason against drinking 
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whisky than against drinking wine; and thus that the conclusion that he would refuse whisky 
is also stronger, in a sense—harder to defeat—than the conclusion that he would refuse cider. 
 Now the mere fact that our friend has reason to refuse any beverages that meet the 
relevant threshold of alcohol content—which is the fact that justifies the assertion of premise 
(1)—does not suffice to make it true that he has stronger reason to refuse higher-ranking 
threshold-meeting beverages than to refuse lower-ranking but still threshold-meeting ones. 
The assertion of premise (1) would be equally justified even if every threshold-meeting 
beverage had identical headache-giving properties; and in that case the conclusion in (2a) 
would be neither easier nor harder to defeat than the conclusion in (5). So in order for the 
cider-and-whisky argument to justify the claim that (5) is indeed more “strongly” supported 
than (2a), we need to expand the inference to include a further premise making it clear that 
what matters is not only that, as we learn from premise (1), the threshold is met, but also how 
far up the scale each threshold-meeting item ranks. We need to revise our scheme to include 
something like premise (6)—which despite its complex-looking formulation is stating a 
simple point—and the extra inferential step to the conclusion in (7): 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
(2) Cider meets T. 
 Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (2a) Our friend will refuse cider. 
(3) Whisky ranks higher than cider on the scale of alcohol content. 
Therefore (from (2) and (3)), 
(4) Whisky meets T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (4)),  
 (5) Our friend will refuse whisky. 
(6) For any two beverages x and y, if both x and y meet T, and if y ranks higher on the 
scale of alcohol content than x, then the range of reasons capable of countervailing 
the reason(s)-in-favour-of-our-friend-refusing-y given by the fact that y-has-the-
degree-of-alcohol-content-that-it-does is narrower than the range of reasons 
capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of-our-friend-refusing-x given by 
the fact that x-has-the-degree-of-alcohol-content-that-it-does. 
Therefore (from (2), (3)—which together imply (4)—and (6)), 
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(7) The range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of-our-
friend-refusing-whisky given by the fact that whisky-has-the-degree-of-alcohol-
content-that-it-does is narrower than the range of reasons capable of countervailing 
the reason(s)-in-favour-of-our-friend-refusing-cider given by the fact that cider-
has-the-degree-of-alcohol-content-that-it-does. 
 
This would give us a reconstruction of the cider-and-whisky inference if we suppose that the 
arguer was trying to establish not merely the conclusion that our friend would refuse 
whisky—that is the claim in (5)—but also the further claim that that conclusion is “all the 
more” justified, or that it follows “even more strongly” from the relevant premises.  
 I think this third inferential step, or something like it, is what we need to bring out in 
order to make sense of the idea that the conclusion that is drawn in an a fortiori argument 
about the target of the inference is a conclusion that follows “even more so” from the relevant 
premises than does the parallel conclusion about the source. This explanation is also 
suggested by what courts themselves sometimes say about the matter. Consider, for example, 
the following excerpt from the European Court of Human Rights decision in Uner v. 
Netherlands [2006] 3 FCR 340:    
 
Even if art 8 of the [European] Convention [of Human Rights] does not . . . contain an absolute right for 
any category of alien not to be expelled, the [European Court of Human Rights] case law amply 
demonstrates that there are circumstances where the expulsion of an alien will give rise to a violation of 
that provision . . . In Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 1179 the court elaborated the relevant criteria 
which it would use in order to assess whether an expulsion measure [of an alien who had first come to the 
host country as an adult] was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. These criteria [include]: 
. . . 
— the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled. 
. . . 
Although the applicant in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 1179 was already an adult when he 
entered Switzerland, the court has [later] held the “Boultif criteria” to apply all the more so (à plus forte 
raison) to cases concerning applicants who were born in the host country or who moved there at an early 
age (see Mokrani v France [2003] ECHR 52206/99 at para 31). Indeed, the rationale behind making the 
duration of a person’s stay in the host country one of the elements to be taken into account lies in the 
assumption that the longer a person has been residing in a particular country the stronger his or her ties 
with that country and the weaker the ties with the country of his or her nationality will be.  
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The a fortiori argument described here—the argument in the Mokrani decision—is relying 
(a) on the premise that alien residents who came to the host country as adults (the source 
item in the inference) have a connection with the host country that is sufficiently strong or 
important for the length of their stay in the country to be one of the criteria to be taken into 
account when assessing whether their expulsion is warranted (which does not mean that they 
are taken to have a connection with the host country sufficiently strong for their expulsion to 
be deemed unwarranted); and (b) on the premise that both alien residents who came to the 
host country as children and alien residents who were born in the host country (the target 
items) rank higher on that scale of importance of connection with the host country; so in their 
case, too, length of stay is to be taken into account. But on top of this there is the suggestion 
that in the case of aliens who came to the host country as children and in the case of aliens 
born in the host country, the reasons that count in favour of making length of stay a criterion 
are even stronger—harder to defeat—than those that count in favour of making length of stay 
a criterion when assessing the expulsion of aliens who have come to the host country as 
adults. A duration of stay of, say, 20 years, gives a stronger reason against expelling a 
resident who came into the country as a child than it would against expelling a resident who 
came into the country as an adult. So the conclusion about the target is one that follows, as 
the Mokrani court puts it, “à plus forte raison”—with stronger reason. 
 If my proposed account of what these phrases purport to convey is right, however, then a 
different worry emerges: for the insertion of a premise like (6) in the cider-and-whisky 
argument appears to upset rather than complement the previous steps in my proposed 
reconstruction. Why so? Because if there are reasons capable of outweighing our friend’s 
reasons against drinking threshold-meeting beverages, then it seems that premise (1) can no 
longer be true. As currently stated, this premise asserts that if a beverage meets the relevant 
threshold of alcohol content, our friend will refuse it; it presents the fact that a beverage 
meets the threshold as sufficient for our friend to refuse it: 
 
 (1)  There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
 
But this cannot be the case if, as we are supposing, there are circumstances under which our 
friend would accept a drink, and with good reason, even if the drink does meet the relevant 
threshold. So we should rewrite premise (1) to reflect this. But then the revised premise—call 
it “(1')”—will no longer present the mere fact that a beverage meets the relevant threshold as 
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sufficing to make it true that our friend will refuse it. And that means that the conclusion in 
(2a) would no longer follow from the conjunction of (1') and (2), and likewise that the 
conclusion in (5) would no longer follow from the conjunction of (1') and (4). It seems, 
therefore, that if we do add something like premise (6) to our previous reconstruction of the 
cider-and-whisky argument, we will have to rethink all the previous steps. 
 This is all true, but for our present purposes the worry is relatively easy to allay. All we 
need is to interpret the conditional sentence in premise (1) as a statement of what some might 
want to call a “defeasible” conditional: a statement that specifies, not a condition whose truth 
suffices on its own for the consequent to be true, but a condition whose truth suffices in the 
absence of defeating considerations for the consequent to be true. So we can rewrite premise 
(1) to read: 
 
(1') There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
and there are no defeating considerations, then our friend will refuse it. 
 
My suggestion is not that a formulation like (1') is the best way of representing defeasible 
conditionals. In fact, I do not think it is. There is a great deal of controversy around the issue 
of how best to characterise the idea of a defeasible conditional, and some theorists would 
argue that if we incorporate into the antecedent of such a conditional—as I did in (1')—a 
rider like “there are no defeating considerations,” we fail to do justice to the very idea of a 
defeating consideration. Surely, they say, defeating considerations—exceptions—stand 
“outside” rather than “inside” the very conditional or rule they purport to defeat, the 
conditional or rule they are exceptions to. There is some truth in this view. On the other hand, 
we also want to be able to rely on claims like (1) to draw deductively valid inferences; and 
that seems to imply that we do need to reformulate them in such a way that the antecedent 
specifies a condition whose truth does suffice for the consequent to be true—which does call 
for a rider of some sort specifying that no exceptions are present. This sounds like a dilemma, 
but I think it can be solved. But this is not the place to engage further with this topic, which I 
have discussed at length elsewhere.10 For the discussion would no longer specifically 
concern—or teach us anything about—a fortiori inferences. All we need in order to move 
forward with our understanding of the a fortiori is the assumption, which I think is true, that 
there is a way of reformulating the conditional in (1)—and any similar conditional—that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Luís Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions (Oxford University Press 2015). 
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meets the two desiderata of (a) allowing the absence of defeating considerations to feature as 
one of the elements in the antecedent, while (b) doing full justice to their very nature as 
defeating considerations. So for our present purposes my suggestion is that we just take the 
simple formulation given above as (1') to stand for whatever formulation turns out (in the 
light of one’s theory of defeasibility) to best meet those two desiderata: for (1') gives us a 
simple but vivid way of illustrating the kind of revision to our schemes that is needed once 
we have included premise (6) and the inference to the further conclusion in (7). 
 Let us, then, reformulate our schemes to incorporate this further inferential step—with 
one caveat, which is that the claim that the conclusion about the target of an a fortiori 
inference is “more strongly” supported than the parallel conclusion about its source, appears 
to be a claim only typically rather than necessarily made by whoever gives an a fortiori 
argument. What does seem to be essential to what we recognise as a fortiori arguments is 
their focus on the fact that a certain item meets (or fails to meet) a certain relevant threshold. 
It is only when, in addition to that, it is also the case that the normative significance—the 
reason-giving strength—of an item’s having the relevant threshold-meeting-making property 
will itself vary according to where on the scale the threshold-meeting item falls, that there 
will be room for an arguer to claim that her conclusion about the target is indeed “all the 
more” justified than the parallel conclusion about the source. To mark this difference, I will 
place square brackets around those elements that are characteristic but not essential 
components of a fortiori inferences. So here is how we can revise the first of our two 
patterns, the pattern of a fortiori inferences that rely on the fact that the relevant threshold is 
met: 
 
(i') There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x meets T [and there are 
no defeating considerations], then x is Q. 
(ii) a meets T. 
(iii) b ranks higher than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii) and (iii)), 
(iv) b meets T. 
[(iv') There are no defeating considerations.] 
Therefore (from (i) and (iv) [and (iv')]), 
(v) b is Q. 
[(vi) For every x and every y, if both x and y meet T, and if y ranks higher than x on the 
scale of P, then the range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-
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favour-of-y-being-Q given by the fact that y-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does is 
narrower than the range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-
favour-of-x-being-Q given by the fact that x-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does. 
Therefore (from (ii), (iii)—which together imply (iv)—and (vi)), 
(vii) The range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of- b-being-
Q given by the fact-that-b-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does is narrower than the 
range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of-a-being-Q 
given by the fact that a-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does.] 
 
What about a fortiori inferences of the second kind—inferences that rely on the fact that a 
certain relevant threshold is not met by the source, and that the target ranks even lower on the 
relevant scale? Is there room here for an arguer to claim that the conclusion about the target is 
“even more strongly” justified than the conclusion about the source? (Or should the claim 
rather be that the conclusion about the target is “even less” justified than the one about the 
source? That would not make sense.) The answer is “Yes.” But, again, such a claim would 
turn on (a) there being a normative connection between the fact that a non-threshold-meeting 
items does not have the relevant threshold-meeting-making property, and the fact that it is Q; 
and (b) that normative connection being such that the reason-giving strength of of an item’s 
not having the relevant threshold-meeting-making property would vary according to where 
on the scale the non-threshold-meeting item falls. The correspondingly revised scheme (again 
with the square brackets around the non-essential components) looks like this: 
 
(i*) There is a point T in the scale of P such that, for every x, if x does not meet T [and 
there are no defeating considerations], then x is Q. 
(ii*) a does not meet T. 
(iii*) b ranks lower than a on the scale of P. 
Therefore (from (ii*) and (iii*)), 
(iv*) b does not meet T. 
[(iv') There are no defeating considerations.] 
Therefore (from (i*) and (iv*) [and (iv')]), 
 (v*) b is Q. 
[(vi*) For every x and every y, if neither x nor y meets T, and if y ranks lower than x on 
the scale of P, then the range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-
favour-of-y-being-Q given by the fact that y-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does is 
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narrower than the range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-
favour-of-x-being-Q given by the fact that x-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does. 
Therefore (from (ii*), (iii*)—which together imply (iv*)—and (vi*)), 
(vii*) The range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of- b-being-
Q given by the fact-that-b-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does is narrower than the 
range of reasons capable of countervailing the reason(s)-in-favour-of-a-being-Q 
given by the fact that a-has-P-to-the-degree-that-it-does.] 
 
 
HANDLING REAL ARGUMENTS  
 
Two aspects of the previous discussion may have struck you as odd. One is how much more 
complex my proposed schemes are than the statements with which actual arguers present 
their a fortiori inferences. It took our imaginary arguer ten words to give his cider-and-
whisky argument. Is it really plausible to think that such a simple statement conceals an 
inference as intricate as the reconstructions I have put forth? 
 The second aspect regards the first premise in my reconstructions: the premise that 
identifies the relevant scalar property against which the source and the target of the inference 
are being compared. In the case of the cider-and-whisky inference, which is a simple example 
concocted for discussion purposes, the identification of the relevant scale may seem an easy 
enough task. But in none of the legal examples I gave so far is it obvious what the relevant 
scale is. Take the cows-and-horses inference from Davies v. Jenkins. While the court’s 
argument seems quite plausible when we read what the court actually wrote, it is far from 
clear—to say the least—that the items the court is comparing really are (as I suggested) a 
description of cows specifying only their number and a description of horses specifying only 
their number, and that the scale against which they are being compared is (as again I 
suggested) the scale of amount of information provided relative to the amount of information 
required. Is this not, you might wonder, a somewhat farfetched interpretative hypothesis of 
mine, rather than a clarification of the court’s actual argument? 
 These two aspects are closely related. It is true that there is a considerable mismatch 
between the elements featured in my proposed schemes, and the relative paucity of 
information actually conveyed by courts when they do give a fortiori arguments. But that is 
not a shortcoming of the schemes. It is, rather, I think, a distinctive feature of arguments of 
this kind. Very often, an arguer who offers an a fortiori argument will explicitly say only that 
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given that a certain claim is true of the source, it follows a fortiori that a claim of the same 
kind is true of the target. In other words, the elements that the arguer will put forth are two 
conclusions—one about the source, the other about the target—of underlying arguments that 
it will be for the audience to discern. And one crucial component of these underlying 
arguments is indeed the relevant scale against which the source and target are to be contrasted 
in order for the argument to run. More interesting, however, than the fact that arguers may 
leave many crucial elements of their inferences unstated, is the fact that some of those 
elements will occasionally be opaque—at least that is my impression—even to the arguers 
themselves; and that certainly includes the relevant scale. 
 Sometimes, of course, the scale is just as obvious as the one in the cider-and-whisky 
argument. Consider this example, from the decision of the Inner House (Second Division) in 
Manson v. Chief Constable for Strathclyde (1983): 
 
I would also be prepared to hold . . . that the action is rendered incompetent by the principle of the 
common law that Acts and decrees of the Court of Justiciary cannot be reviewed by the Court of Session, 
from which it would follow a fortiori that they cannot be reviewed in a civil action in the Sheriff Court.  
 
Here too all the court gives us is (a) a statement about the source of the inference, (b) a 
statement about the target, and (c) the claim that the latter “follows a fortiori” from the 
former. But it seems clear that the two items being compared are the Court of Session on the 
one hand, and the Sheriff Court on the other; and that the court is implicitly relying on the 
fact that even though the Court of Session ranks higher than the Sheriff Court on the 
hierarchical scale of the judiciary—which is a scale that tracks the scope of each court’s 
powers—it still does not rank high enough for the Court of Session to have the power to 
review acts of the Court of Justiciary. As soon as we understand this, then, we realise that—
as I have suggested—each of the Court’s explicit claims (a) and (b) above, is being put forth 
as the conclusion of an unstated inference; but the inferences are easy enough to reconstruct. 
 Another example in which the relevant scale would not seem too hard to identify—
perhaps a scale ranking actions by an employee in breach of his or her duty of confidentiality, 
according to how potentially harmful they are to the employer’s business?—is the following 
argument from Roger Bullivant Ltd v. Ellis [1987] IRLR 491: 
 
[I]t is obvious that, if it is a breach of the duty of good faith for the employee to make or copy a list of the 
employer’s customers, the removal of a card index of the customers is an a fortiori case. 
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And sometimes the court itself makes the relevant scale, which might not otherwise be 
obvious, explicit, as in this example from The Grovehurst [1910] P 136: 
 
I want to say a word about trawlers getting out of the way of other vessels. In my opinion, the whole object 
of putting into law the necessity for carrying the triplex light when the trawl is down is to shew vessels 
approaching, not that the trawler will act under the ordinary sea rules, but that she, at the time, is incapable 
of following the sea rules, and that the vessel which is approaching must get out of the way. There is a case 
in which it was held that a sailing vessel should do so, and there is a rule which says that sailing vessels 
shall do so, but there is no rule which says that a steamer must get out of a trawler’s way. But if a sailing 
vessel should do so, a fortiori a steamer should, because she has more power to get out of the way of a 
trawler which is denoting by her lights that she has her trawl down. 
 
In order to understand relatively straightforward examples like these—and to assess their 
plausibility—it is true that there might be little use in seeking to reconstruct and display the 
court’s argument with the schemes I have proposed. Sometimes, however, things are less 
transparent. Consider the case of In re Gramophone Company’s Application [1910] 2 Ch 423. 
The Gramophone Company, which sold machines that it advertised as “gramophones”, was 
seeking to register the word “gramophone” as its trade mark. To the general public the word 
designated record-operating talking machines without reference to any particular source of 
manufacture. Among the trade, however, the word did refer to a specific kind of machine in 
connection with its source. The court turned to what it referred to as the “Perfection Soap 
Case”—the case of In re Joseph Crosley & Sons, Ltd [1910] 1 Ch 130—in which the Court 
of Appeal had refused an application to register the word “perfection” as a trade mark, even 
though that word had in fact come to acquire “both in the trade and to some degree also 
among the public, a secondary meaning connoting the soap of the persons applying for the 
registration.” The reason behind this refusal was (as the Gramophone court reports it) that  
 
the word [“perfection”] was a mere laudatory epithet, likely to be required by others to describe their 
goods, and a monopoly in the use of which could not fairly be granted to any single manufacturer. 
 
The Gramophone court then offers an a fortiori argument based on this decision in the 
“Perfection Soap Case”: 
 
If a laudatory word such as “perfection” ought not to be admitted to registration, although among the trade 
it has become distinctive of the goods of a particular manufacturer, it seems to me to follow, a fortiori, that 
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the name by which an article is popularly known ought not to be admitted to registration as a trade mark 
for that article, although in the trade it may have come to connote the source of manufacture. 
 
Is this a good a fortiori argument? Is it an a fortiori argument at all? It is not easy to say. And 
the reason it is not easy to say is precisely that the court, in perfectly typical fashion (as a 
fortiori arguments go), fails to specify what the relevant scale—the scale against which both 
source and target are being compared—is supposed to be.  
 I think the Gramophone argument is an a fortiori argument. The court’s point is, I think, 
that (a) admitting to registration as the trade mark of a company a word which in its popular 
use refers (as does “gramophone”) primarily to a kind of product of which that company is 
not the sole manufacturer, would confer upon that company a greater benefit than admitting 
to registration as trade mark a word which in its popular use refers (as does “perfection”) 
only secondarily to a kind of product of which the company is not the sole manufacturer; and 
that (b) the latter benefit is already in excess of what could fairly be granted to any single 
company. But the very fact that this is something that cannot be immediately detected 
illustrates rather than diminishes the importance and the practical usefulness of the schemes 
put forth in the previous sections of this paper. For it is precisely by virtue of having 
discerned the characteristic forms of a fortiori inferences that we even know what to look for 
when assessing real arguments as they are deployed in judicial decisions. It is the fully 
unpacked scheme that reveals that the inference will not run without premises of a certain 
sort; and this enables us to consider the plausibility of ascribing to the court, despite its lack 
of explicitness, a commitment to premises of the relevant sort—as I tried to do with the 
Gramophone example.  
 The critical gains are also considerable. If we do succeed in reconstructing a full a 
fortiori argument that we can attribute to the court, we will then be well-placed to assess how 
good the court’s a fortiori actually is: for although the inference will be valid, any one of its 
premises may be false, in which case the argument will have failed to justify its conclusion. 
By being fully clear about what those premises all are—and clarity about this is again what 
the schemes provide us—we can be sure that we have thoroughly assessed the court’s 
argument; and if we do not succeed in piecing together a full a fortiori argument attributable 
to the court as its argument, then we can safely conclude that the court has failed—despite 
what it may claim—to provide a valid inference of this kind. 
 Sometimes, indeed, the prima facie plausibility of a court’s claim to have justified a 
conclusion by means of an a fortiori argument turns out, upon reflection, to be deceptive; and 
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this too can be harder to detect or fully criticise if we have no clear picture of the scheme that 
such an argument should instantiate. A good (if somewhat lengthy) illustration of this point 
comes from the case of Mann Macneal and Steeves v. Capital and Counties Insurance 
Company [1919 M2050], in which the Court of Appeal took issue with what looked like a 
plausible a fortiori inference; this is an excerpt from Younger LJ’s opinion: 
 
The learned judge [whose decision is being appealed] . . . labelled this gasolene as dangerous cargo in the 
abstract, as merchandise which, when included in a general cargo . . . substantially increases the risk of an 
insurance upon her hull, as goods so attended with hazard beyond the common that their certain inclusion 
as part of the cargo to be carried deprives the insurer of his useful chance that nothing so dangerous to the 
safety of the ship will be on board during the voyage insured. Not that the learned judge was not well 
entitled to deal with this question as he did; much of the evidence given before him seemed plainly to 
convey that everything that could be said against these gasolene drums on a steel or iron ship would a 
fortiori apply to them on a wooden ship, and perhaps most of all on an auxiliary wooden vessel like the 
Elmir Roberts. But a careful consideration of all the evidence in the case . . . impresses me with the 
conviction that the only aspect of the matter with reference to which the statements just referred to are 
well-founded has little if any relevance to the question of materiality in relation to this particular risk when 
looked at from what I conceive, upon the whole evidence, to be the only proper standpoint. For while it is 
undoubtedly true that the presence of such a cargo, whether on a well-found iron or steel ship or on a 
wooden sailing, steam, or auxiliary oil vessel, may seal the fate of the vessel should the gasolene caught by 
the fire explode, and will do so with greater certainty in the case of a wooden vessel than in the case of one 
otherwise constructed, the relevant distinction for present purposes between the well-found iron or steel 
ship and such a vessel as the Elmir Roberts is that the first class of ship need not, in the event of fire, be at 
risk of destruction at all, apart from the presence of the gasolene amongst her general cargo, while in the 
case of a vessel like the Elmir Roberts it approaches certainty that in the event of a fire breaking out 
sufficiently serious to reach, if unimpeded, the drums in the hold, her fate would be irrevocably sealed, 
long before the flames got so far, by the intermediate burning of her own stores of oil fuel and of any other 
general cargo—in the present case, for instance, the 600 tons of claret staves stowed in the near hold and 
on deck—more immediately inflammable than gasolene itself and equally effective to bring about the total 
destruction of this vessel. In other words, the evidence I think clearly shows that if the vessel was to be lost 
at all by fire it would be only in the remotest contingency that these gasolene drums, stowed away in her 
hold as they were, would play any effective or other part in bringing about her destruction. That this is so 
appears, as it seems to me, from a consideration of the evidence both with reference to this type of vessel 
and with regard to the nature of these gasolene drums. 
 
My impression is that this assessment of what seemed prima facie to be a plausible a fortiori 
inference could have been much more clearly and forcefully expressed—and correspondingly 
easier to evaluate—in the language and format of my proposed schemes. Younger LJ seems 
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to be pointing out that the two items being compared—the source and the target of the 
putative a fortiori—were not relatively placed on the relevant scale as the previous judge 
might have thought. But what exactly is the relevant scale, and what exactly should we say 
were the relevant items? Iron ships and wooden ships? Something else? The exercise of 
trying to formulate explicitly, in the language of our schemes, the view that the Younger LJ 
seems to be endorsing, is bound to be instructive, for it is not immediately obvious how to 
phrase the crucial premise. It takes a moment to realise that what Younger LJ is relying on 
must be something along these lines: 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of increase in risk of destruction in the event of a fire 
such that if the presence of gasoline in the cargo of a ship brings about an increase 
in the risk that the ship would be destroyed in the event of a fire, which increase 
meets T, then the presence of gasoline in that ship’s cargo counts as a substantial 
increase in the risk of an insurance beyond what the insurer may be presumed to 
have accepted. 
 
If we take this as our first premise, why then could the judge whose decision was being 
appealed not have constructed a plausible a fortiori argument? Younger LJ agrees that 
 
(2) The presence of gasoline in the cargo of an iron ship brings about an increase in 
the risk that the ship would be destroyed in the event of a fire, which increase 
meets T. 
 
This is a claim about the source of the putative a fortiori inference: it asserts that the source 
does meet the relevant threshold. But with regard to the target of the inference, Younger LJ’s 
point, more clearly expressed in terms of our schemes, seems to be that 
 
 (3) The presence of gasoline in the cargo of a wooden vessel brings about an increase 
in the risk that the ship would be destroyed in the event of a fire, which increase 
ranks lower on the scale of increase in risk of destruction in the event of a fire than 
the increase in risk brought about by the presence of gasoline in the cargo of an 
iron vessel. 
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The target, then, ranks lower than the source on the relevant scale. And this enables us to 
recast Younger LJ’ point as the—correct—claim that (2) and (3) together do not entail (4): 
 
(4) The presence of gasoline in the cargo of a wooden ship brings about an increase in 
the risk that the ship would be destroyed in the event of a fire, which increase 
meets T. 
 
Indeed, the attempt to justify (4) on the basis of (2) and (3) would be an instance of what we 
have already identified, in the second section of this paper, as a formally fallacious pattern. 
 And our schemes do not just help us to be clearer about the import and cogency of 
earnest efforts—like Younger LJ’s—to engage with and refute an a fortiori argument 
submitted by some other party or court. The schemes also allow us to look with a critical eye 
at somewhat hasty attempts to dismiss a fortiori inferences as the following, from Lord 
Hewart CJ’s leading judgment in Carpenter v. Fox [1929] 2 KB 458: 
 
The [respondent’s] argument seems to be that because the restrictions contained in these regulations 
[forbidding motor cars to stand on the highway so as to cause unnecessary obstruction] are applicable to 
motor cars properly so called [where the class of “motor cars” was defined by regulations as including 
vehicles with a maximum weight of 9 ¾ tons] . . . therefore a fortiori they are applicable to vehicles which 
exceed those weights. That argument, with all due respect to the learned counsel who put it forward, seems 
to me to be a complete non sequitur. It is as if one were to say that because a statute applies to a dog, 
which may be a little fox terrier, it must apply much more to a horse which is a much larger animal. The 
answer is that the two things are on different planes, and the law relating to the one may be found in quite a 
different plane from the law relating to the other. 
 
But of course whether the respondent’s a fortiori really was a “complete non sequitur” will 
turn on whether the two items did rank in the right way relative to each other on the relevant 
scale. As we know from our discussion in the preceding sections, there is nothing suspicious 
in and by itself about the fact that an arguer who offers an a fortiori argument might say 
simply “the regulations apply to motor cars; therefore a fortiori they are applicable to 
weightier vehicles”, leaving the other elements of the inference unstated. Likewise with fox 
terriers and horses: one can easily imagine scenarios in which a plausible a fortiori argument 
could indeed be given in justification of the claim that if a certain statute applies to dogs, then 
a fortiori it does also, or should, apply to horses. 
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 Many of the examples we have been looking at are examples of a fortiori arguments in 
which the premise asserting that the source of the inference meets (or fails to meet) the 
relevant threshold, is a premise derived from past judicial authority; and in which the a 
fortiori argument is being deployed to directly justify deciding a certain substantive issue in a 
certain way. But a fortiori inferences can also be used to justify drawing conclusions about 
the applicability of statutory provisions and other kinds of legal texts, and this is something 
on which our schemes can throw some light as well. One interesting use of a fortiori 
arguments in this regard is to justify the application of a provision to a situation not 
contemplated in its text; and one reason this use is interesting is that the premise asserting 
that the source of the a fortiori meets (or fails to meet) the relevant threshold is typically 
justified by reference to the statutory provision itself. 
 This is very frequent in civil law jurisdictions, but common law courts do sometimes 
argue in the same manner. One example is Lord Kerr’s argument from Moohan and another 
v The Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, which I quoted in the Introduction. As I then said, 
Lord Kerr was arguing that Article 3P1 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which 
explicitly mentions only “elections” for “the choice of the legislature”, might nonetheless be 
applicable to votes of other kinds, and namely to the Scottish independence referendum: 
 
This phrasing [of Article 3P1] may, on one view, point to a focus on legislative elections, but it by no 
means justifies an exclusion of other votes. Why should it? If voting for a representative in a legislature is 
deemed sufficiently important that it should be guaranteed to all, why would voting for the form of 
government be deemed less important? 
 
We now have the tools to reconstruct this argument. The relevant scale will be something like 
political “importance.” How then should we formulate the first premise? The first part is easy 
enough to put together: 
 
(1)  There is a point T on the scale of political importance such that, if a type of vote x 
meets T, then . . . 
 
But what should the consequence be? We should keep in mind that Lord Kerr is arguing for 
the conclusion that Article 3P1 may be applicable to types of votes not mentioned in its text. 
But surely the mere fact that an event or type of vote not mentioned in the text ranks higher 
than legislative elections on the scale of political importance will not suffice to justify the 
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conclusion that Article 3P1 does “apply” or “extend” to it. After all, there may be (and there 
typically are) constraints of different sorts on the admissibility of extending enacted 
provisions to situations “beyond” their text. This suggests that we should complete the 
formulation of premise (1) along the following lines: 
 
(1) There is a point T on the scale of political importance such that, if a type of vote x 
meets T, then if x is not contemplated in the text of Article 3P1, then Article 3P1 is 
applicable to x if . . .  
 
This ellipsis would then be filled with whatever further constraints would have to be met for 
the provision to be applicable. This could then be combined with the following two premises: 
 
 (2) An election for the choice of legislature meets T. 
 (3) An independence referendum ranks higher than an election for the choice of 
legislature on the scale of political importance, 
 
which together justify the conclusion that 
 
 (4) An independence referendum meets T. 
 
The justification for premise (2) would be the very fact that elections for the choice of 
legislatures are explicitly contemplated in Article 3P1. And premises (1) and (4), together 
with the (true) claim (which we could write as a further premise) that an independence 
referendum is an event not contemplated in the text of Article A3P1, would justify the 
conclusion that 
 
 (5) Article 3P1 is applicable to an independence referendum if . . . 
 
which would then enable the arguer to go on asserting that the remaining conditions for the 
applicability of the provision were met. 
 In civil law jurisdictions, a fortiori arguments of this kind—arguments used to “extend” 
enacted provisions beyond the scope of their “letter”—are often said to rely on two supposed 
!
37 
interpretative “principles” or “maxims,” sometimes rendered in Latin.11 One is the principle 
“qui potest plus potest minus”: he who may (which is taken to mean: is explicitly permitted 
to) do the more, may also (implicitly) do the less. The other is its contrapositive: “qui non 
potest minus non potest plus”: he who may not (which is taken to mean: is explicitly 
forbidden to) do the less, may also not do the more. It seems obvious, however, that these 
principles cannot be taken to hold true in general; and they fail to warrant inferences of the 
right sort. First, we can never say of any two items that one is “more” and the other “less” 
without appealing to a scale on which they can be set alongside each other and classified.12 
But for every two items, there will always be some property with regard to which each is 
“more” or “less” than the other. So we do not just have to identify a scalar property; we need 
to identify the relevant scalar property.13 And even when we have identified a scalar property 
that we take to underlie some explicit prohibition or permission, it does not necessarily 
follow—as we have just seen when discussing Lord Kerr’s argument in Moohan—that courts 
will be authorised to “extend” the provision, or to take it to apply “implicitly,” to any 
“greater” or “lesser” case. Whether that is so will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Georges Kalinowski, Introduction à la logique juridique (Paris: R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias 
1965) 162-165. 
12 Maccoby reports an ancient “parodic” a fortiori inference, said to have been presented by a certain 
rabbi—Rabbi Jose ben Taddai of Tiberias—who argued that since he was forbidden to marry the daughter (his 
own daughter) of someone who was permitted to him (his wife), then all the more so should he be forbidden to 
marry the daughter of someone (e.g. his neighbour’s wife) who was forbidden to him. Therefore “all marriages 
should be forbidden except to the daughters of unmarried mothers, widows, or divorced women.” This is funny, 
but it also illustrates what can go wrong when there is no (true) premise to be found identifying a scale (and a 
relevant threshold) against which to compare both source and target. The joke, incidentally, was poorly 
received: Maccoby also reports that the rabbi “was actually excommunicated for presenting a frivolous [a 
fortiori] argument, since this was held to bring rabbinic methods of argument into disrepute.” Tough crowd. See 
Hyam Maccoby, “Some Problems in the Rabbinic Use of the Qal Va-Chomer Argument” (2010) 4 Melilah 80-
90 at 86-87. 
13 Goltzberg seems to me to confuse these points. He thinks that if we grant that guilty and suspect are 
notions can be ranked on the same “argumentative scale,” we must grant that a statutory provision that protects 
the guilty will automatically protect the charged (“Si la legislation protège le coupable, elle protège 
automatiquement—à plus forte raison—celui qui est seulement poursuivi”) and vice versa (“Si la legislation 
[ne] protège le suspect, elle ne protège pas le coupable”). But these, as stated, are non sequiturs. See Stefan 
Goltzberg, Théorie bidimensionelle de l’argumentation juridique: Présomption et argument a fortiori (Brussels: 
Bruylant 2012) 70-71. 
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within each jurisdiction, from area of law to area of law. Remember how Portia succeeded, in 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, in preventing Shylock from exacting his bond: 
 
The words expressly are “a pound of flesh”: 
 Take then thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh; 
 . . . 
 Therefore prepare thee to cut off the flesh. 
 Shed thou no blood, nor cut thou less nor more 
 But just a pound of flesh: if thou cut’st more 
 Or less than a just pound, be it but so much 
 As makes it light or heavy in the substance, 
 Or the division of the twentieth part 
 Of one poor scruple, nay, if the scale do turn 
 But in the estimation of a hair, 
 Thou diest and all thy goods are confiscate. 
 
There is nothing odd, argumentatively, about this: it could have been the law. Or consider 
this passage from the European Court of Human Rights decision in Deweer v. Belgium 
[1980] ECHR 6903/75: 
 
[I]n the area of human rights he who can do more cannot necessarily do less. The [European] Convention 
[of Human Rights] permits under certain conditions some very serious forms of treatments, such as the 
death penalty (article 2(1), second sentence), whilst at the same time prohibiting others which by 
comparison can be regarded as rather mild, for example “unlawful” detention for a brief period (Article 
5(1)) or the expulsion of a national (Article 3(1) of Protocol No. 4). The fact that it is possible to inflict on 
a person one of the first-mentioned forms of treatment cannot authorise his being subjected to one of the 
second-mentioned, even if he agrees or acquiesces[.] 
 
The “qui potest” principles, then, are not reliable; and in contexts in which courts are indeed 
allowed to “extend” enacted provisions, on the basis of a fortiori arguments, to situations not 
contemplated by the provision’s text, what we need in order to be clear about the relevant 
inference, are (as our discussion of Moohan illustrates) the schemes identified in this paper.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 14 Let me also stress that—contrary to what is sometimes supposed—this is not the only way in which a 
fortiori arguments can be used to justify conclusions about the applicability of legal provisions. There is in 
principle nothing preventing a court from relying on an a fortiori inference to support the claim that the case at 
hand falls under some concept or term featured in the text of relevant provision: that it is a case to which the 
provision’s text applies directly rather than one to which the provision can be “extended.” If there is a question 
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 My goal in this section has been to illustrate the illuminating power of the argument 
schemes articulated and explained in the previous sections; and to deflate the possible 
objection that to engage with those schemes is to bring in a degree of complexity that hinders 
rather than helps our understanding and assessment of real instances of a fortiori arguments 
as they are deployed in judicial decisions. I hope to have shown that the schemes are not 
merely very helpful, but indeed necessary for the proper analysis of such real arguments. And 
now that we have a sufficiently clear picture of what an a fortiori argument is and how it 
runs, we can perhaps draw some conclusions about why and when an arguer might want to 
avail herself of an inference of this kind.    
 
 
THE USES OF A FORTIORI ARGUMENTS 
 
Let me bring you back to our cider-and-whisky example in order to emphasise one important 
point. We saw that this argument—an argument for the conclusion that our friend will refuse 
whisky—relies on the following premise: 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
 
This is, as we also saw, a characteristic feature of a fortiori inferences: an arguer who 
deploys an argument of this kind is relying on it being the case that there is a certain 
threshold T on the scale of a certain property, such that the issue of whether that threshold is 
(or is not) met is relevant to the question the arguer is trying to settle. But there are, of course, 
other ways in which an arguer might rely on this very premise—premise (1)—to support the 
same conclusion that our friend will refuse whisky. Indeed, there is a direct inference to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
about whether the case at hand (the target case) counts as an instance of a certain notion featured in the text of 
the provision; and if an affirmative answer to that question depends on the case meeting a certain threshold on 
the scale of a certain property; then if there is, say, authority for the claim that a certain other case (the source 
case) does count as an instance of the relevant notion; and if the court is in a position to affirm that the target 
case ranks higher on the relevant scale than the source case; then the court can argue a fortiori for the 
applicability of the provision to the source. The (false) assumption that the role of a fortiori arguments in law is 
to “extend” statutory provisions beyond their text is a common theme of many of the items quoted above in n 7.  
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drawn for that conclusion, an inference that does not rely on any claim about cider or any 
other beverage: 
 
(1) There is a point T in the scale of alcohol content such that if a beverage meets T, 
then our friend will refuse it. 
(2) Whisky meets T. 
Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Our friend will refuse whisky. 
 
This is a deductively valid argument. Why then should our arguer not offer this rather than 
the cider-and-whisky a fortiori inference in support of the conclusion? One answer might be 
that our arguer is not in a position to straightforwardly assert premise (2) and combine it with 
premise (1). Why not? Perhaps our arguer does not know what the alcohol content of whisky 
actually is. But if she nevertheless knows that the alcohol content of whisky (whatever it is) is 
higher than the alcohol content of cider, and that cider does meet the relevant threshold, then 
she can on that basis validly infer that the claim in (2) is true, and then go on to combine it 
with the claim in (1) in support of the final conclusion—which is, as we have seen, the 
pattern of the a fortiori. 
 Similarly, an arguer does not need to know what the relevant threshold is in order to be 
in a position to assert premise (1). An arguer may have no idea of where to draw the line on 
the relevant scale—she may not know exactly how high in alcohol content a beverage has to 
be for our friend to refuse it—and yet know that there is such a threshold: know that there is a 
threshold, whatever it is. And again an arguer who did know what the relevant threshold is, 
and knew also what the alcohol content of whisky is, could construct another valid inference 
that would directly support the same conclusion—that our friend will refuse whisky—without 
having to rely on either the claim in (1) or the claim in (2). 
 This suggests, I think, that the characteristic point of deploying an a fortiori argument is 
that it allows us to sidestep certain types of constraints—constraints like one’s lack of 
evidence that would directly support a claim like (2) above, or one’s lack of knowledge of the 
relevant threshold—that render certain other kinds of inferences unavailable. To be more 
systematic, my suggestion is that it is one distinctive feature of a fortiori arguments that they 
are uniquely suited to justify conclusions in contexts in which (a) the question that the arguer 
is trying to settle turns on whether a certain relevant threshold has been met, but (b) the 
!
41 
arguer is prevented from settling that question by directly assessing whether the relevant 
threshold is met in the case at hand. 
 What could prevent an arguer from doing that? I see two types of constraints. First, as we 
have just observed, there could be epistemic constraints: constraints due to the arguer’s (or 
indeed the arguer’s audience) ignorance of either (a) what the relevant threshold is, or (b) 
where exactly on the relevant scale the target of the inference ranks, or (c) both. But, second, 
there could also be what I will refer to as normative constraints, and these come into play 
when an arguer—regardless of her knowledge of the relevant aspects—has reason not to take 
a stand on either (a) what the relevant threshold is, or (b) where exactly on the relevant scale 
the target of the inference ranks, or (c) both. 
 When could there be such a reason? Well, the legal context is certainly one in which 
arguers’ use of a fortiori arguments does often seem to be a way of justifying a decision in 
the instant case while consciously avoiding to take a view on what the relevant threshold 
exactly is. Think back to the several examples from judicial decisions that we have had 
occasion to consider. One feature that runs through all of them is that there is no directly 
applicable authority on the basis of which the court can settle the question at hand and justify 
the conclusion about the target. If there were, indeed, there would be no pressing need for the 
court to resort to an a fortiori argument. (Which is not to say that the court would be 
prevented from doing so; it could give an a fortiori argument alongside a direct authority-
based argument for the same conclusion, and there may be contexts in which there would be 
reason to do so—for example if the court thinks its interpretation of the authoritative 
provision or precedent is bound to be controversial.) A second common feature is that there is 
also no authority on the—different—question of whether the target of the a fortiori meets the 
relevant threshold. But a third feature that runs through most of the examples is that the 
premise asserting that the source of the a fortiori meets (or fails to meet, as the case may be) 
the relevant threshold, is a premise that the court is able to justify by reference to previous 
judicial authority. This is not to say that the present court’s considered view on the matter 
would have coincided with the previous court’s. But if there is authority for the claim that the 
source does meet or fail to meet the relevant threshold; and if it is the present court’s view 
that the target item ranks either higher or lower (as the case may be) on the relevant scale 
than the source; then that is, it seems, a reason for the present court to adopt, with regard to 
the target, the same view—the view that the target meets or fails to meet the relevant 
threshold—that the previous court had adopted with regard to the source; and to then go on to 
justify, on that basis, its decision on the question at hand. 
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 What kind of reason? It is still an authority-based reason. It is true that the previous 
court’s decision is not strictly binding in the present case, for the simple reason that it is not 
directly applicable to it. The present case is a case about the target item, not about the source; 
and because there is no authority on whether the target meets the relevant threshold, the 
question falls outside the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis. But the same considerations 
that underlie the doctrine of stare decisis—consistency, coherence, equality, predictability—
also count in favour of deciding this question in the same way that the parallel question about 
the source case was previously decided. And if in the present court’s view, the previous 
court’s take on the threshold-meeting status of the source of the inference is not obviously 
wrong or objectionable, then the present court will have reason to rely on that previous 
decision as a premise for an a fortiori argument—adopting it as true or correct—even if its 
own assessment of the matter in the absence of this previous authority might have turned out 
to be different. 
 This by itself counts against the previous court’s addressing itself directly to the question 
of whether the target of the inference does indeed meet (or fail to meet) the relevant 
threshold. It is therefore an example of what I would classify as a normative constraint 
against dealing directly with that issue. On top of that, it could also be that the question of 
whether any given item—including the target of the inference—does indeed meet the 
threshold is a particularly difficult or controversial question; and this (apart from constituting 
an epistemic constraint on its own) might pose further normative constraints: for the court 
may want to avoid committing itself to a view of which it may not be fully sure, but which, if 
indeed the court were to commit itself to it, might come to influence (as either binding or 
persuasive authority) future courts’ decisions on similar cases. By deciding to settle the case 
at hand by means of an a fortiori argument, the court avoids these potentially unwelcome 
consequences by dealing with the matter in a different way. 
 (To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the premise asserting that the source of the 
inference meets or fails to meet the relevant threshold is a premise necessarily to be justified 
on the basis of previous authority. There can be other, non-authoritative reasons for accepting 
such a premise regardless of its substantive correctness. It could be common ground between 
the parties, for example; or it could be granted by the party against whom the a fortiori 
inference is being deployed. It could also be that the court’s assertion of that premise is the 
product of its own direct application of the relevant threshold to the source item: ignorance of 
what the threshold is is only one sort of epistemic constraint that an a fortiori inference can 
help to overcome.) 
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 This account shows that a fortiori arguments have some features in common with 
analogical arguments in law. Should we say, as some authors do, that the former are just a 
species of the latter?15 The answer, I think, is negative, but this is not a question that can be 
satisfactorily dealt with in this paper: that would presuppose that we have before us an 
equally clear picture of arguments by analogy in law. We can note, however, that there are 
similarities between the two kinds of argument. Like arguments by analogy, arguments a 
fortiori that rely on previous judicial authority in support of the premise about the source case 
are a way of “extending” that previous authority to a target case that is similar to the source 
in some relevant respect. Moreover, we can now also point out that the schemes that we have 
identified as the schemes of a fortiori inferences would be equally suitable, with just one 
minor amendment, to represent those arguments in which the court’s view is that the source 
case and the target case are identically ranked on the relevant scale, and thus that the 
threshold is met by either both or neither. An argument like this, which might plausibly be 
called “analogical” in some sense of the word, would not be an a fortiori one—it would be 
what is sometimes called an argument a pari (“from the similar”: from the similarly placed or 
graded)16—but in order for it to fit our schemes all we need is to slightly rewrite the form of 
third premise to read as follows: 
 
 (iii**) a and b are equally ranked on the scale of P.    
 
But there also seem to be important dissimilarities between arguments a fortiori and the kinds 
of argument that both lawyers and theorists normally refer to as “analogical” arguments. One 
salient difference is that even in fully reconstructed arguments by analogy, the comparison 
between items—between the source and the target case—does not rely on the identification 
of any unifying rule specifying their relevant common features.17 In a fully reconstructed a 
fortiori inference, on the other hand, the relevant unifying scale does have to be specified in 
the premises in order for the argument to run. A broader exploration of the contrast, however, 
I must leave for another day. 
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15 This issue is discussed in most of the pieces quoted in n. 7 above. 
16 See e.g. Carlos E. Alchourrón, “Los argumentos jurídicos a fortiori y a pari” in C. E. Alchourrón and E. 
Bulygin, Análisis Lógico y Derecho (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1991) 3-24 at 19-23. 
17 For details, see “The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law” (n. 5).!
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CONCLUSION!
 
Perhaps the most notable feature of a fortiori arguments is that very often an arguer who 
offers an argument of that kind will leave almost every essential component of the inference 
unstated. The crucial elements of the argument—the premises on which the arguer is relying, 
or needs to be relying in order for the inference to run—are typically omitted, if not 
concealed, in what an arguer actually says or writes. This may lend a fortiori arguments 
considerable rhetorical strength. But it makes it all the more difficult to assess whether the 
argument being given really is a good one. To compound this difficulty, very little scholarly 
attention has been paid so far to inferences of this kind, which have remained considerably 
obscure to legal practitioners and theorists alike. 
 This paper was an attempt to remedy this state of affairs. I have sought to bring out the 
distinctive form of a fortiori inferences, and to show how an awareness of their structural 
features can assist us in assessing real instances of the argument for both logical validity and 
substantive soundness. I argued in the main body of the paper that a fortiori arguments are 
arguments that (a) rely on premises about (a1) the relative position of two items—the 
“source” and the “target” of the inference—on the scale of a certain property, and (a2) 
whether the source item meets a certain relevant threshold on that scale; and (b) validly 
derive conclusions on (b1) whether that threshold is also met by the target item, and (b2) on 
the consequences thereof. And I went on to argue, in the final section, that the characteristic 
role of a fortiori arguments is that they enable arguers to circumvent certain sorts of 
epistemic and normative constraints that prevent them from directly tackling the question of 
whether the target item does meet the relevant threshold. 
